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CHAPTER 5
An Eye Toward Effective Enforcement: 
A Technical- Comparative Approach 
to the Drafting Negotiations
Tara J. Melish
Th e Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is a historic 
achievement on many levels. Hard- fought and comprehensive, it promises 
to change the way the rights of persons with disabilities are understood and 
socially claimed by a broad range of stakeholders for generations to come. 
Th is is as true for the rights of persons with physical and sensory disabilities 
as it is for those with psychosocial, intellectual, and other developmental or 
learning disabilities.
It may be noted in this latter respect that a fairly high degree of confi -
dence existed from the beginning of the negotiations that the fi nal draft ed 
treaty would off er important and signifi cant protections for persons with 
physical and sensory disabilities. What was far less clear was the level of 
protection the new treaty would off er persons with intellectual and psycho-
social disabilities. Such persons have long faced a particularly abusive and 
deeply embedded set of social ste reo types regarding competency that have 
functioned in practice to institutionalize and legitimize structures that of-
ten deny their very capacity to act and make free decisions as recognized 
human beings. Th ese widely held attitudes have served historically to justify, 
both legally and socially— and hence to render invisible from a mainstream 
human rights lens— such stark abuses against such persons as their forced 
segregation and warehousing in institutional facilities, relegation to separate 
educational, housing, and employment settings, subjection to long- term 
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restraints and forced interventions in the name of treatment, and enforced 
loss of legal capacity. Such abuses would provoke an immediate and sustained 
international outcry by the global human rights community if committed 
against persons without mental impairments, either real or perceived. To 
ensure that the acceptability of such abusive and discriminatory practices 
was not transposed into the new treaty, either directly or indirectly, explicit 
strategies of socialization, awareness raising, and legal framing would need 
to be a major focus of the negotiation pro cess.
Disability Rights International— then Mental Disability Rights 
International— entered the negotiations with this problematic in mind, 
intent on ensuring that the substantive and procedural protections in the 
treaty  were as eff ective and meaningful for persons with mental disabilities 
as they  were for persons with physical and sensory disabilities. It is thus use-
ful to highlight DRI’s substantive mission and how it calculated that it could 
most eff ectively pursue this mission through the CRPD negotiation pro cess, 
especially in coordination with the many other members of the disability 
rights movement present in the negotiations who, while diff ering at times in 
approach,  were equally committed to this important goal.
Th is chapter is accordingly divided into three parts. Th e fi rst part seeks 
to explain the strategic approach DRI took to the CRPD negotiation pro cess, 
highlighting its methodology, the guiding principles it embraced, and the 
resulting strategies of engagement it pursued. Th e second part turns to some 
of the key substantive issues DRI focused on in its interventions and advo-
cacy before the Ad Hoc Committee. Th e chapter concludes with a brief re-
fl ection on the Convention, the ultimate effi  cacy of DRI’s approach, and the 
road ahead.
DRI’s Strategic Approach to the Drafting Negotiations
Authorized to participate in the very fi rst session of the AHC, DRI under-
stood early on that it had a potentially important strategic role to play in the 
CRPD negotiation pro cess. Th at role derived primarily from its institutional 
status and operational expertise as the leading international human rights 
or ga ni za tion dedicated to protecting the human rights and full participa-
tion in society of persons with disabilities worldwide. Th at is, unlike most 
international disability rights organizations, which have taken up the hu-
man rights framework only more recently in their global work, DRI had 
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assumed an express human rights identity from its inception in 1993; it was 
founded precisely to make visible the human rights violations against persons 
with disabilities that the mainstream human rights community had long 
chosen to ignore. Correspondingly, with a substantive focus on ending the 
institutionalization of persons with disabilities and promoting their social 
integration into community settings where they could live with dignity and 
human rights on an equal basis with others, DRI’s methodological focus has, 
since its founding, been rooted in the strategic use of international human 
rights treaties and their corresponding monitoring and enforcement mech-
anisms to achieve its advocacy objectives.
DRI thus came to the CRPD negotiating pro cess with signifi cant fi rst-
hand experience using existing regional and international human rights 
treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Po liti cal Rights, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention Against Torture, and 
the American and Eu ro pe an conventions on human rights. Together with 
other disability rights instruments, these treaties have framed and struc-
tured the human rights methodologies and advocacy tactics DRI has em-
ployed over the last two de cades. Such methodologies have ranged from 
detailed investigative reporting and global shaming campaigns, to grass-
roots training and institutional staff  education, to human rights advocacy 
before supranational policy-making and technical forums, to regular use of 
UN human rights oversight mechanisms and strategic litigation before the 
world’s regional human rights bodies.
DRI’s work program and institutional profi le had two signifi cant im-
plications for its strategic approach to the CRPD negotiating pro cess. First, 
based on the practical lessons learned from its long- term work using the 
existing international human rights architecture, DRI came to the pro cess 
with a priority concern for maximizing the operational eff ectiveness of the 
CRPD’s provisions from an institutional enforcement or implementation 
perspective. DRI appreciated that achieving this important objective would 
require close attention to the details of the treaty’s technical and structural 
draft ing. Second, and closely related, DRI was particularly alert to ensuring 
that the treaty contained not only strong substantive norms, but also strong 
procedural safeguards and in de pen dent monitoring guarantees. Such safe-
guards and guarantees, DRI recognized, served essential instrumental roles 
in the implementation pro cess, especially as enforcement “hooks” before 
domestic and supranational supervisory tribunals and as necessary external 
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checks on the substantive protection of rights. Such checks  were particularly 
important for monitoring institutional policies and practices related to legal 
capacity, supported decision making, medical treatment, and any form of 
institutionalization or incarceration, all primary issues in DRI’s global 
human rights work. Both concerns, each core to DRI’s understanding of how 
rights are most eff ectively enforced in practice, aff ected how DRI approached 
its role in the negotiation pro cess. Each is addressed more substantively 
below.
The Treaty’s Operational Effectiveness
DRI’s fi rst strategic priority, as noted, centered on ensuring that the CRPD 
was technically draft ed in a way that would maximize its operational en-
forceability before a range of domestic and international policy- making fo-
rums and legal tribunals. DRI’s experience had taught it that, although a 
great deal can be done through purposive interpretation of human rights 
texts, the precise formulations through which a treaty or treaty norm is 
draft ed can have tremendous impact on the possibilities for institutional 
and legal oversight. DRI thus came to the negotiation pro cess with a priority 
concern not just for the recognition of critical concepts in the Convention, 
but also for how those concepts  were technically framed and structured 
inter se. Accordingly, DRI saw a major part of its role in the negotiation 
pro cess as seeking to improve the CRPD from a technical or operational 
perspective, ensuring that the treaty did not repeat mistakes or re create nor-
mative inconsistencies that have served in practice to impede the eff ective 
enforcement of human rights under the existing international human rights 
architecture. Th is was true both for the treaty text itself and for its optional 
protocol.
DRI’s approach was correspondingly calculated to complement that of 
many of the other NGOs and disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) en-
gaged in the pro cess. Given deeply entrenched social ste reo types and the 
invisible status of many of the most regularized abuses committed against 
persons with disabilities, the majority of these civil society groups had found 
it necessary to focus their oral interventions and advocacy eff orts on em-
phasizing the experiential and lived aspects of human rights abuse in the 
disability context. Th is was most frequently done through powerful per-
sonal testimonials by persons with disabilities themselves about their own 
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experiences with societal and institutional discrimination, interventions 
that  were vital to the negotiation pro cess.
DRI did not seek to replicate these powerful testimonials. Rather, it 
sought to complement and reinforce them by placing them in technical con-
text wherever possible, especially by emphasizing their legal basis and justi-
fi cation within the existing international human rights law architecture and 
jurisprudence. It thus sought to place DPO calls for recognition of certain 
rights and concepts within the context of other major human rights treaties 
and the evolving jurisprudence of the Eu ro pe an Court of Human Rights, 
the inter- American human rights bodies, the African Commission, and the 
many UN treaty bodies, including their general comments and observa-
tions. At the same time, it sought to expose dangers in delegate- proposed 
treaty language, especially with respect to the recognition of explicit excep-
tions to rights- based rules in the treaty text and the creation of other kinds 
of “let- out” clauses that would enable states to avoid taking on real legal re-
sponsibilities with respect to systemic institutional and policy reforms. In 
this way, DRI saw its primary role as attempting to ensure that, in substan-
tively addressing the rights of persons with disabilities, the Convention text 
did not create incompatibilities with other instruments of international and 
regional human rights law, that it in fact strengthened existing legal pro-
tections rather than diminishing or simply repeating them, and that it was 
structurally well designed from a technical- operational perspective— getting 
the law qua law right.
DRI’s par tic u lar technical- comparative approach to the draft ing nego-
tiations was, in turn, reinforced by its choice of or gan i za tion al representa-
tive. For this role, it hired an international human rights attorney and legal 
expert in comparative human rights systems with signifi cant experience 
studying and working before regional and UN human rights monitoring 
systems. Although this representative had worked closely with DRI on dein-
stitutionalization litigation and advocacy in the inter- American human 
rights system and had personal connections to disability, she was known to 
DRI as a human rights comparativist with a par tic u lar technical- legal bent. 
Th e expectation was thus that she would monitor the draft ing pro cess from 
the perspective of ensuring the draft  convention’s technical and legal com-
patibility with other international human rights instruments and the juris-
prudence developed thereunder by the respective supervisory bodies. At the 
same time, DRI’s representative was not new to the CRPD negotiation pro cess. 
She joined DRI’s legal team immediately aft er leaving a technical position in 
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the CRPD draft ing committee’s substantive secretariat. She thus possessed a 
close working knowledge of the negotiation pro cess from its inception, the 
work of the AHC over its prior sessions, and the evolving negotiating positions 
of the varied participants. Indeed, in her earlier position she had been tasked 
with preparing daily summaries of the key issues and points of confl ict for 
the AHC chair, maintaining transcript notes of the proceedings, preparing 
background conference papers and briefi ngs (on such issues as compara-
tive national approaches to reasonable accommodation), and attending 
intersessional Bureau meetings of the Committee.
Consistent with this technical focus, DRI adopted a par tic u lar method-
ology of engagement in the negotiation pro cess. First, following its represen-
tative’s practice as UN social aff airs offi  cer, DRI maintained a close- to- verbatim 
transcript of all delegate interventions in the AHC. Shared on a daily basis 
with all requesting state delegations, national human rights institutions, UN 
offi  cials, and civil society participants, this unoffi  cial transcript was used to 
keep track of how many states supported or opposed each issue as well as the 
specifi c arguments or justifi cations used to defend those positions. By scru-
pulously recording and monitoring the precise positions of all parties, DRI 
sought to make its interventions as targeted and value additive as possible. 
Interventions  were structured in par tic u lar to do fi ve principal things.
First, DRI aimed never to make abstract or merely conceptual points. 
Rather, it sought to respond directly to technical issues raised in debate that 
suggested misinterpretations or misapplications of international human 
rights law. It would, accordingly, begin each intervention by recognizing its 
satisfaction or signifi cant concern with the positions taken by specifi c sets of 
states on a given issue or draft  article. Briefl y expressing its support for the 
substantive positions already highlighted by other DPOs, NGOs, and Com-
mittee members, it would then focus its observations on two to four techni-
cal issues that had not yet been raised in the discussion that could nonetheless 
shed light on the text under debate.
Second, in raising these technical issues, DRI sought explicitly to situate 
its responses to delegate proposals within the context of recognized interna-
tional law principles, both substantive and interpretive. It accordingly fre-
quently sought to allay delegate concerns as to specifi c language choices or 
textual terminology by explaining their foundational basis in or consistency 
with authoritative interpretations of UN and regional human rights bodies 
in their evolving jurisprudence. DRI’s interventions thus cited broadly to 
the provisions and interpretations of other treaty texts as a way to ground 
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and substantiate the proposals of civil society groups and friendly states. It 
did so even while insisting on the need not to fall into the trap of merely re-
constituting existing norms in the CRPD; indeed, the treaty’s very raison 
d’être was to relate existing norms to the specifi c experience of persons with 
disabilities and the distinct ways their rights are impacted by widespread 
social, attitudinal, institutional, and architectural barriers.
In this respect, DRI’s interventions sought to mediate two of the domi-
nant thematic tensions running throughout the draft ing pro cess, constantly 
reminding states of the early decisions that had been made thereon. Th e fi rst 
related to the treaty “model” the CRPD was to follow. A major debate in the 
fi rst two AHC sessions involved whether the new treaty was to follow a nar-
row “nondiscrimination” model (like the Convention Eliminating All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination), a “comprehensive” model (like the 
CRC), or a “hybrid” model that combined elements of the two. Th e general 
consensus arrived at by the AHC in authorizing the Working Group to pro-
ceed with a draft  text was that the CRPD should follow a hybrid model. Th is 
approach was vital, it was agreed, given the recognized failure of existing 
treaty language to ensure in practice the rights of persons with disabilities 
worldwide. Accordingly, explicit substantive specifi cation of the precise 
ways in which the human rights of persons with disabilities  were regularly 
violated was indispensable to the treaty’s instrumentality and purpose. In 
fl oor debate, states nevertheless repeatedly tried to return to a mere nondis-
crimination model, simply repeating rights already recognized in existing 
treaties and hence losing the distinctive quality of the disability- specifi c 
text.
Th is tendency was reinforced by a closely related thematic tension, one 
that continues to raise challenges in the post- adoption ratifi cation and imple-
mentation stages. Th at tension arises from the interpretive friction between 
two assertions regarding the CRPD, both correct and each raised consistently 
throughout the draft ing pro cess. First, the CRPD creates no new rights in 
international law. Second, in affi  rming the substantive equality of existing 
rights in their application to persons with disabilities, the CRPD recognizes 
the distinct ways that those rights are lived and experienced by persons with 
disabilities on a daily basis— experiences that oft en diff er quite substantially 
from those of persons without disabilities. Indeed, it is precisely because of 
this diff erential treatment, and particularly the justifi catory assumptions 
underlying them, that the rights of persons with disabilities have for so long 
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remained invisible from the mainstream human rights lens. DRI thus re-
peatedly found itself affi  rming the basis of textual provisions in existing inter-
national human rights law, while defending textual wording that departed 
from existing treaty language in its recognition of the distinct ways those 
rights are experienced by persons with disabilities.
Th ird, in relating its technical points to the specifi c proposals raised in 
fl oor debate, DRI made an express point of specifying by name each of the 
individual states that had off ered positions on the issue, identifying those 
positions as either consistent or inconsistent with international law prin-
ciples. It did so not only for situational and legitimation purposes, but also 
for reasons of peer- based persuasion and socialization. Th e interventional 
tactic was thus directed toward recognizing and affi  rming as international 
norm leaders those states supporting pro- persons with disabilities positions, 
encouraging them to continue taking such positions. Correspondingly, by 
expressly naming states taking positions inconsistent with international 
law principles or harmful to the equal rights of persons with disabilities, 
DRI sought to identify them before their peers as human rights outliers, 
situated outside the mainstream human rights consensus. It was hoped 
that a dynamic would be promoted through which state delegations would 
seek to take public positions that grouped them with international norm 
leaders.
At the same time, on a more direct tactical level, because DRI oft en 
raised narrow technical issues that might not in de pen dently generate direct 
fl oor debate, it sought to identify its positions with specifi c proposals al-
ready raised by identifi ed state delegations. Th e purpose was to make it easy 
and natural for those delegations to make the points their own, directly in-
corporating them into their own proposals, advocacy, and peer- based con-
sultations with other states. Th is was particularly important given the relative 
lack of time DRI’s representative had for broad- based consultations with 
state delegations, given the corresponding need to maintain a detailed re-
cord of delegate interventions and to prepare DRI’s own article- by- article 
oral interventions.
Fourth, DRI sought to avoid repeating points raised eff ectively by others 
or for which there was already a clear consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee. 
Rather, it sought to “add” to what other civil society and state actors had 
said by focusing on points not yet raised in fl oor debate and/or by providing 
a perspective or explanatory approach that diff ered from, but complemented, 
that which had already been taken by state delegations and other DPO and 
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NGO leaders, especially the International Disability Caucus. As explained 
below, DRI was not able to join the IDC given certain tactical diff erences in 
approach regarding the most eff ective way to protect key rights related to 
legal capacity and institutionalization. It nonetheless sought to support IDC 
positions in all other areas of substantive advocacy.
Finally, and relatedly, DRI used the technical focus of its interventions to 
try to fi nd consensus positions or “ways through” substantively divisive or 
otherwise diffi  cult issues. Th e off er of a “neutral” technical perspective was 
frequently very helpful in this regard, especially when participants appeared 
to be talking past each other on the underlying substantive issue or as a way 
to explain principled text to skeptical delegations in ways they might be 
more inclined to comprehend. Th is was particularly important on such issues 
as inclusive education and the lack of need, from a practical or legal per-
spective, to recognize specifi c exceptions or qualifi ers to rights in the text of 
the treaty. In this latter regard, recognizing the basis of a provision in an-
other treaty or underscoring the practical methodologies used by human 
rights bodies to interpret distinct norms, especially those that created sig-
nifi cant positive obligations for states, oft en helped to quiet concerns that 
treaty language was creating impossible standards for states to meet and 
hence needed to be explicitly qualifi ed in the text.
DRI thus sought to articulate major points in ways that could be “heard” 
both by skeptics on state delegations and by the more technically minded 
participants in the negotiations. Th e utility of this perspective was oft en ap-
parent in the relative quieting of the committee room when DRI made its 
oral interventions and in the number of delegations asking for written cop-
ies of the same. Th is neutral technical focus was also used to mediate certain 
disagreements within the disability community itself. Indeed, by under-
scoring the international law basis of discrete components of competing 
interest- based positions, DRI sought to identify textual pathways that could 
meet the core interests of all aff ected constituencies.
Strong Procedural Safeguards and 
In de pen dent Monitoring Guarantees
DRI’s second priority concern in the negotiating pro cess lay in ensuring 
that the Convention’s substantive norms  were accompanied by strong pro-
cedural safeguards and in de pen dent monitoring guarantees. DRI was con-
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vinced that the Convention would provide little protection for persons with 
disabilities if it did not provide expressly for in de pen dent monitoring of the 
treaty’s substantive protections by civil society groups and persons with dis-
abilities themselves. At the same time, it was alert to the fact that interna-
tional human rights supervisory bodies oft en mediate their subsidiary role 
as guarantors of rights vis-à- vis domestic authorities by relying preferen-
tially on procedural safeguards and other procedural hooks as a way to le-
verage the substantive protection of rights. Th is is particularly true where 
such bodies must balance competing rights and/or legal duties held by the 
state and where substantive agreement as to the scope of the underlying 
norm has not yet been suffi  ciently concretized in the circumstances at issue, 
necessitating a certain margin of appreciation for local authorities. Accord-
ingly, ensuring the existence of strong procedural safeguards and enforce-
able pro cess commitments throughout the text of the treaty was a par tic u lar 
priority for DRI in ensuring the treaty’s operability in post- adoption imple-
mentation pro cesses.
Th is principled priority concern nevertheless had an important implica-
tion for DRI in the negotiating pro cess: it prevented the or ga ni za tion from 
being able to join the IDC. Th e IDC had been created to coordinate the posi-
tions of the vast number of civil society groups participating in the negotia-
tion pro cess, allowing them to advance a common platform and speak with 
a single voice, thereby amplifying their presence, persuasiveness, and author-
ity as equal negotiating partners. A “consensus” program, the IDC platform 
nonetheless incorporated certain “nonnegotiable” positions that not all or-
ganizations could accept. In par tic u lar, at the urging of key groups in the 
psychosocial disability community, such as the World Network of Users and 
Survivors of Psychiatry (WNUSP), the IDC had adopted a nonnegotiable 
position on the issues of institutionalization and legal capacity. Th at posi-
tion would accept nothing less than a full and express prohibition in the 
treaty on both civil commitment and forced treatment. To underscore the 
absoluteness of the dual prohibitions, the IDC had taken the negotiating 
position that it would accept no legal safeguards in the text of the treaty 
with respect to either. DRI, it is important to emphasize, agreed unreserv-
edly and categorically with the IDC on the underlying substantive issues: as 
a matter of principle, DRI opposes forced treatment and believes that all 
institutions can be closed. Nonetheless, as a tactical matter, it recognized 
that there are many ways to achieve these ends, and an absolute prohibition 
might not be the most eff ective way of doing so.
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Indeed, from a pragmatic perspective, the achievement of a direct prohi-
bition in the treaty appeared largely unrealistic with respect to what states 
could po liti cally be expected to adopt in a legal instrument at the present 
time. Far more important, by forfeiting some of the most eff ective treaty- 
based tools for ensuring the protection of the critical underlying substantive 
rights, the position appeared shortsighted and even counterproductive from 
an operational perspective. Given that every country we know of today per-
mits institutionalization and forced treatment, DRI believed that indirect ways 
of pressuring and incentivizing governments to change practices may be the 
best strategy for achieving the disability community’s shared objectives.
To be able to freely advocate this tactical position in the negotiation 
pro cess and to off er specifi c language proposals with respect to procedural 
protections, hard pro cess commitments, and in de pen dent monitoring guar-
antees designed to promote participation, oversight, and transparency, DRI 
was accordingly compelled to remain formally outside the IDC. Th is is 
true even as it supported IDC positions on virtually every issue in the nego-
tiation process— including the IDC’s evolving position on procedural safe-
guards by the end of the negotiations.
Guiding Principles for DRI Interventions
All the above led DRI to approach the CRPD draft ing pro cess with a certain 
set of guiding principles in mind. Th ese principles refl ect the primary thrust 
of DRI’s interventions and advocacy in the AHC, including with respect to 
the key issues in the negotiations highlighted below.
DRI’s fi rst priority, as already underscored, was to ensure that no lan-
guage included in the treaty was weaker than or inconsistent with that found 
in existing international human rights law instruments. It thus structured 
its interventions around existing norms of international law, explaining in 
as accessible language as possible why distinct state draft ing proposals  were 
either consistent or inconsistent with recognized international law princi-
ples and the evolving jurisprudence thereon. Th is was as true with respect to 
substantive norms— such as attempts to dilute international human rights 
standards on the rights to health, work, and education, and on state duties to 
ensure against discrimination in private settings— as it was with respect to 
the inclusion of paternalistic language and inappropriate qualifi ers on rights 
such as “endeavor to” and “to the extent possible.”
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Second, DRI’s interventions repeatedly insisted that the Convention must 
be one of broad principles, not detailed exceptions. DRI thus constantly chal-
lenged state proposals seeking to insert express exceptions to rights norms or 
their correlate duties in the draft  treaty, especially where the rights of per-
sons with mental disabilities  were at issue and with respect to resource com-
mitments. A prominent cohort of states even tried to insert a footnote into 
the Convention— a dangerous practice followed in no other human rights 
treaty— that would exempt them from any obligations relating to the guar-
antee of legal capacity for persons with disabilities, citing the lack of separate 
words for “legal capacity” and the exercise thereof in their national languages. 
“In Arabic, Chinese and Rus sian,” the footnote would have read, “the term 
‘legal capacity’ refers to the capacity for rights, rather than the capacity to act.” 
Allowing exceptions such as these and others into the text of the treaty, DRI 
insisted, would signifi cantly undermine its very object and purpose as an 
instrument to ensure the equal rights of persons with disabilities. Indeed, as 
Liechtenstein’s delegate had aptly observed, doing so would be like enumer-
ating all the ways child discipline is permitted under the CRC, or that persons 
can in fact be treated diff erently under the ICCPR. Th is is decidedly not 
the purpose of a human rights treaty, a key point to which DRI consistently 
returned in its interventions.
At the same time, DRI believed it equally imperative that the treaty 
not overly detail or predetermine the content of rights. Th e treaty would be 
most eff ective, DRI believed, if its guarantees  were recognized in broad, 
open- textured ways, contoured by the overarching principles of dignity, in-
clusion, social agency, and participation. Th is was true over both space and 
time. Indeed, such texture would allow interpretation and implementation 
strategies to vary as necessary over distinct geographies, allowing the treaty to 
be maximally responsive to the varied contexts, realities, imaginations, and 
changing priorities of aff ected communities around the globe. On the other 
hand, it would ensure the interpretive elasticity necessary for treaty norms to 
evolve progressively with time and comparative experience— a quality of par-
tic u lar import as the world disability community gathers strength, social 
consensus shift s, and new opportunities and barriers present themselves. 
Indeed, because all rights are bounded by social expectations and evolving 
context, such normative elasticity is crucial for the long- term relevance and 
responsiveness of all rights- based strategies, platforms, and creative discourses.
A third principle guiding DRI’s interventions was the insistence that the 
CRPD’s substantive norms must be framed and recognized as rights, not 
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merely as state duties or general undertakings. As experience with other 
treaties has shown, this technical framing is important for ensuring that 
human rights treaty provisions can in fact be eff ectively claimed as rights 
by individuals before international tribunals and other supervisory mech-
anisms. DRI was thus highly vigilant to attempts by delegations, whether 
intentional or unintentional, to remove references to rights in the course 
of redraft ing provisions. It specifi cally challenged such attempts, for ex-
ample, with respect to the draft  norms on accessibility, access to justice, 
inclusive education, reasonable accommodation, and habilitation and 
 rehabilitation.
Similarly, DRI paid close attention to the evolving structure of the draft  
treaty and, specifi cally, to where norms  were placed therein. For example, 
the treaty was long divided substantively into separate parts. Part I encom-
passed the treaty’s purpose, general principles, and general obligations, 
while Part II included the treaty’s substantive rights. When the Australian 
delegation thoughtfully called for the movement of the provision on acces-
sibility to a higher position in the Convention to refl ect its central impor-
tance thereto, the provision was nonetheless moved from Part II to Part I. 
DRI intervened to insist that Australia’s well- intentioned objective was not 
served, and in fact was undermined, by the provision’s movement into Part 
I where it would no longer be interpreted as an autonomous right, but rather 
as a general obligation. Th is was important from an operational perspective, 
DRI believed, as the norm would now need to be affi  rmatively paired with a 
substantive norm from Part II for its direct enforcement, at least by an inter-
national tribunal. (Th e same was true, DRI argued, with respect to the rec-
ognition of nondiscrimination exclusively in Part I, rather than as a norm 
that should appear in both parts, as in most other human rights treaties. It 
conversely applied to the AHC’s failure to include a duty to provide eff ective 
remedies in Part I to accompany the late- added guarantee of eff ective access 
to justice in Part II.)
In direct response to these technical arguments, the Committee agreed 
to remove all textual references to structural “parts” from the treaty. It thereby 
sought to obviate any interpretive inference that the referenced norms  were 
intended to be understood exclusively as duties. As with many issues, this 
was not the ideal technical solution from DRI’s perspective. It was nonethe-
less an important technical modifi cation that would be highly consequential 
for the treaty’s post- adoption interpretation under general principles of 
international law.
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Fourth, DRI was consistently guided by the precept that the treaty’s in-
dividual norms should directly and textually refl ect the principles of social 
inclusion, community integration, participation, and individual develop-
ment, as was generally done in the Working Group draft . Inclusion of such 
language was operationally important at the implementation stage, DRI 
believed, for ensuring a broad, relevant, and evolving interpretation of the 
treaty’s norms in distinct national and disability contexts. It was particu-
larly important for avoiding interpretations based on “formal equality” rea-
soning alone and, specifi cally, for preventing the conversion of treaty norms 
into “benefi ts traps,” that is, interpreted to allow ser vices to be provided in 
ways that lead to further segregation of persons with disabilities. Such sepa-
rate systems are oft en expressly justifi ed in national systems under “equality” 
rationales— frequently with explicit exemptions for minimum wage require-
ments and other labor protections for persons with disabilities in employment 
contexts and through the off er of mere busywork, rather than work that pro-
motes individual dignity, development, and social inclusion.
At the same time, DRI was highly sensitive to the loss of key language 
from individual provisions when norms  were split apart or other draft ing 
modifi cations  were made, oft en in an attempt to simplify language or to ac-
cord the CRPD provisions with existing human rights treaty norms, especially 
those of the International Covenant on Civil and Po liti cal Rights. Th e result 
of this “simplifi cation,” or streamlining pro cess, was oft en to lose the very 
specifi city and relevance of the CRPD to the disability context. Th e draft  
norms on freedom from torture and personal integrity, for example,  were 
not only needlessly divided into separate articles, but  were streamlined to 
repeat almost verbatim the text of the ICCPR. Th ere  were likewise strong, 
but ultimately unsuccessful, eff orts to remove references to free and in-
formed consent from the norm on the right to health. As indicated previ-
ously, the eff ect of removing the disability specifi city of such norms largely 
obviates the need for a separate disability convention. Accordingly, while 
DRI acknowledged the benefi ts of streamlined text for the clarity and ele-
gance of the treaty, it repeatedly underscored the necessity of not allowing 
important conceptual elements of rights to get lost in the streamlining 
pro cess.
Finally, as already noted, DRI’s interventions  were closely attuned to the 
inclusion of strong procedural safeguards for ensuring substantive rights 
norms and hard pro cess commitments for achieving rights- based outcomes. 
It was thus a strong advocate of in de pen dent international monitoring, as 
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well as robust and mutually reinforcing procedural safeguards for any form 
of intervention in the freely decided life choices of persons with disabilities.
Key Issues in the Negotiations
Th e methodologies and guiding principles described above governed DRI’s 
interventions with respect to all substantive norms of the Convention. 
Below, a few of the key substantive issues focused on as part of DRI’s par-
ticipation in the AHC are likewise described. Although many of the impor-
tant arguments and issues DRI advanced are not captured  here, a taste is 
off ered.
Legal Capacity and Procedural Guarantees 
for Supported Decision Making
For DRI, as a human rights NGO focused primarily on ending human rights 
violations committed against persons with disabilities as a result of abusive 
civil commitment procedures and guardianship practices, forced institu-
tionalizations and treatment, social and residential segregation, and lack of 
available support for living in the community on an equal basis with others, 
the level of protection the CRPD would off er against these practices was the 
or ga ni za tion’s top priority in the negotiation pro cess. Th e question of legal 
capacity and the ability of persons with disabilities to make free and informed 
decisions about where and with whom they live, what medical interventions 
they consent to, and other basic personal decisions about their bodily integ-
rity and private lives  were particularly central to DRI.
To DRI’s satisfaction, the fi nal text of the CRPD provides multiple layers 
of protection with respect to many of these issues, including in Articles 14, 
15, 17, 18, 19, 22, and 25. DRI made substantive interventions with respect to 
all of these provisions, consistently affi  rming the need for strong safeguards 
on and guarantees for ensuring decision- making autonomy and the avail-
ability of real options for inclusion and participation in the community. 
Article 12 was nonetheless vital to DRI’s or gan i za tion al principles and pri-
orities. It enshrines the right of persons with disabilities to recognition of 
their legal personality and to the enjoyment of legal capacity on an equal 
basis with others in all aspects of life.
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It is important to highlight in this regard that substantial agreement 
existed in the AHC on the need for recognition in the treaty of this broadly 
phrased right. Far less consensus existed on questions involving the exercise 
of that capacity. Indeed, the issue was volatile, threatening at times to under-
mine the entire negotiation pro cess. Th e volatility revolved specifi cally around 
the following question: To what extent and under what conditions, if any, can 
the exercise of legal capacity lawfully be limited or even fully denied?
Large numbers of participants in the pro cess took opposing positions on 
this important question. At one extreme, a sizable number of states rejected 
the idea that persons with disabilities, especially those with intellectual and 
psychosocial disabilities, could in fact make decisions on their own or live 
in the community in de pen dently. Accordingly, they rejected the idea that 
civil commitments and substituted decision making could be prohibited 
outright, arguing that involuntary institutionalization and forced treatments 
are at times both necessary and benefi cial, especially to protect the safety of 
persons with disabilities themselves or others in the community. Th ey corre-
spondingly sought to enshrine specifi c exemptions into the treaty to recognize 
the right of states to civilly commit, provide nonconsensual treatment to, or 
assert guardianships over persons with mental or other impairments in such 
situations. At the other extreme, the IDC, pressed by vocal and powerful 
groups like the WNUSP, had adopted the converse stance as one of its non-
negotiable positions: it refused to accept the legitimacy of any treaty that 
authorized or permitted the civil commitment, institutionalization, or invol-
untary treatment of persons with disabilities under any conditions, even under 
limited circumstances and with signifi cant due pro cess protections.
For DRI, getting this issue right was crucial for the Convention. As noted, 
given present realities in the world, including the number of institutions 
operating in all regions of the globe, it did not believe that inclusion of an 
outright prohibition on institutionalization or forced treatment in the Con-
vention was po liti cally feasible. Nor did it believe the fi nal treaty would allow 
for no permissible limitation of any kind on the autonomous exercise of 
legal capacity. More importantly, given reservation, nonratifi cation, and 
other legal “exit” options open to states, it was not convinced that the textual 
inclusion of such absolute prohibitions in the treaty would necessarily con-
stitute the most eff ective way of achieving the two priority objectives it un-
equivocally shared with the IDC leadership— ending the institutionalization 
of all persons with disabilities as quickly as possible and maximizing indi-
vidual autonomy in all personal decision making about life choices.
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Accordingly, DRI took a position in the negotiation pro cess that aimed 
toward three complementary objectives. Each directed at promoting a pro-
active dynamic of progress and protection at the implementation stage, they 
included: (1) ensuring the strongest possible state commitments and legal 
duties with respect to the affi  rmative right of all persons with disabilities to 
live in de pen dently in the community with the support ser vices they need 
(that is, not in institutions); (2) supporting overlapping protections for choice 
and autonomous decision making in as many treaty provisions as possible 
(that is, not limited to a single prohibitory provision); and (3) ensuring that 
any assistance lawfully provided to persons with disabilities in exercising 
their legal capacity was governed by the principle of supported (not substi-
tuted) decision making and, likewise, was surrounded by strong and multi-
ple procedural safeguards. Taken together, DRI believed these positions 
would not only promote the strongest state buy- in and participation for end-
ing institutional warehousing and nonconsensual or abusive treatments, but 
would also create the greatest number of implementation hooks and entry 
points for in de pen dent monitoring, participatory oversight, and eff ective 
enforcement.
DRI’s interventions supported this three- prong approach. With respect 
to the third prong, DRI played a particularly active role in ensuring that the 
text of Article 12 expressly included multiple legal safeguards, substantive 
restraints, and review requirements for any possible limitation on the exer-
cise of legal capacity. Citing the extensive safeguards already developed in 
international human rights jurisprudence and in relevant disability instru-
ments, DRI was particularly insistent on textual inclusion of three require-
ments, each viewed as necessary for preventing abuse and ensuring respect 
for the rights, will, and preferences of the person: (1) strict proportionality 
and tailoring to actual individual need in the circumstances; (2) application 
of any limitation or restraint on autonomous decision making for the short-
est time possible; and (3) regularized review by in de pen dent judicial au-
thorities. In achieving the inclusion of these essential safeguards, it sought 
to work with and support friendly state delegations strongly committed to a 
similar approach, such as New Zealand and Israel. Th e fi nal text of Article 
12(4) correspondingly reads:
States Parties shall ensure that all mea sures that relate to the exercise 
of legal capacity provide for appropriate and eff ective safeguards to 
prevent abuse in accordance with international human rights law. 
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Such safeguards shall ensure that mea sures relating to the exercise of 
legal capacity respect the rights, will, and preferences of the person, 
are free of confl ict of interest and undue infl uence, are proportional 
and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest 
time possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, in de-
pen dent and impartial authority or judicial body. Th e safeguards shall 
be proportional to the degree to which such mea sures aff ect the per-
son’s rights and interests.
By providing key leverage points for supervisory enforcement, the opera-
tional eff ectiveness of this “safeguards approach” for preventing unjustifi ed 
institutionalizations and arbitrary deprivations of legal capacity has already 
proven itself in practice. Indeed, the Eu ro pe an Court of Human Rights has 
found express violations of the Eu ro pe an Convention on Human Rights 
where persons have been deprived of their legal capacity without the provi-
sion of appropriate, proportional, and strictly tailored safeguards, including 
regular review. As an interpretive tool, Article 12(4) will undoubtedly con-
tinue to be a vital enforcement hook for issues of institutionalization, civil 
commitment, and guardianships before courts and human rights supervi-
sory bodies around the world.
A second key issue in Article 12— one that is central to the entire treaty 
in shift ing the disability paradigm toward a social model— is its codifi cation 
of the principle of supported decision making in place of substitute decision 
making. It recognizes in this regard that there may be times in a person’s life 
in which he or she needs assistance in making certain personal life decisions. 
Th e practice in such circumstances has historically been to appoint a guard-
ian or substitute decision maker, oft en a family member or the director of an 
institutional facility, who then becomes the exclusive decision maker for 
the person. Such substitute decision making is eff ected even where persons 
with disabilities can express their own will and preferences with respect to a 
given decision or decisions (with or without support) and even where guard-
ians possess substantial confl icts of interest with those persons. Article 12 
seeks to end this abusive practice, one that lies at the core of so many other 
regularized abuses committed against persons with disabilities. It does so 
by requiring that states ensure that persons with disabilities have reliable 
access to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity 
and, correspondingly, by expressly constraining the level of support that 
can be provided to that which is strictly necessary for the  individual at the 
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moment the decision is taken. Where support exceeds this level, Article 12 is 
implicated.
Both of these aspects of Article 12 will prove vital for protecting persons 
with disabilities from the regularized abuse they have experienced both in 
institutions and at home. Th is is especially true with regard to their ability 
to decide where and with whom they will reside and what medical interven-
tions they will consent to, to own and inherit property, to control their own 
fi nancial aff airs, to have equal access to fi nancial credit, and to decide the 
number and spacing of their children as well as other personal life decisions 
at the core of being human.
Living In de pen dently in the Community
Closely related to Article 12, a second core priority for DRI in the negotiation 
pro cess was Article 19, “Living In de pen dently and Being Included in the 
Community.” Indeed, in its day- to- day work, DRI has mounted concerted 
international human rights campaigns against building or rebuilding insti-
tutions for persons with disabilities worldwide, insisting that government 
and donor funds be used instead to invest in safe and dignifi ed community- 
based ser vices and appropriate supports so that persons with disabilities can 
live in de pen dently in the community on an equal basis with others. Corre-
spondingly, its top institutional priority is its Worldwide Campaign to End 
the Institutionalization of Children, a campaign directed against both gov-
ernments and donor agencies that continue to fund the building or rebuilding 
of institutions for persons with disabilities.
A provision in the treaty expressly guaranteeing the right of persons with 
disabilities to live in de pen dently in and be included in the community— 
and creating correlate duties for ensuring access to the resources and sup-
port ser vices necessary for the enjoyment of that right— was thus central 
to DRI’s po liti cal priorities. As highlighted above, such a provision would 
serve as a positive and proactive way to achieve the ultimate goal of ending 
the institutionalization of persons with disabilities. Th e key challenges DRI 
faced to such a provision came in the form of two widely repeated arguments 
by states. Th e fi rst was that the draft  provision created a new right not recog-
nized in other human rights treaties; it thus exceeded the Committee man-
date and could not be included in the treaty as a right. Second, and related, a 
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large number of states argued that they lacked the resources as a practical 
matter to ensure that all persons with disabilities could live in de pen dently 
in the community and that, accordingly, the referenced norm could not be 
recognized in the Convention as a legal right, but only as a programmatic 
goal.
DRI used its oral interventions to respond from a technical- comparative 
perspective to each of these arguments. With respect to the former, DRI 
underscored that the “right to live in the community” was simply a straight-
forward articulation of the widely recognized international norms to non-
discrimination and freedom to choose one’s residence, rights expressly 
recognized in the ICCPR and all three regional human rights treaties. Cor-
respondingly, just as a state may not restrict a person’s options to reside in 
any par tic u lar section of a country, city, or town on account of racial, reli-
gious, or po liti cal grounds, neither may it limit the options of a person to 
live in the community on account of his or her disability— by, for example, 
restricting a person’s residential options to an institution or other par tic u lar 
living arrangement, either directly or indirectly. Such limitations constitute 
unambiguous discrimination under international law. Just as in other set-
tings where societal discrimination has functioned to create segregated so-
cial environments, states have clear affi  rmative legal obligations to take all 
appropriate and necessary mea sures to ensure that persons with disabilities 
can enjoy freedom of living arrangement on an equal basis with others.
With respect to the second argument, DRI underscored a similar legal 
point to that which it had made throughout the negotiations: ensuring the 
eff ective enjoyment of human rights on an equal basis by all is an expensive 
and resource- intensive undertaking with regard to all rights. It is precisely 
for this reason that states undertake the conduct- based obligation to take all 
“appropriate” mea sures to ensure the enjoyment of rights, with the defi nition 
of what is “appropriate” necessarily responsive to local realities. All major 
human rights tribunals and supervisory bodies take this distinction into 
account in their individual- rights jurisprudence. Accordingly, the fact that 
enjoyment of a right cannot be achieved in full immediately for all rights- 
holders is not a legitimate or credible justifi cation for not recognizing it as a 
“right.” Indeed, if it  were, we would recognize no human rights in interna-
tional treaties, including the right to equal treatment on grounds of race, 
gender, or religion— the full enjoyment of which has not yet been achieved 
in any national community.
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Th e right to equal treatment, then, is a work in progress with respect to 
all grounds of discrimination. Th e instrumental purpose of international 
human rights law, DRI insisted, is to create legal duties for states to take all 
appropriate and necessary mea sures to ensure, without delay and on a targeted 
basis, the enjoyment of rights by all rights- holders on an equal basis. Such 
conduct- based mea sures include reviewing and revising national legislation 
and policies, training offi  cials in their human rights obligations, creating 
benchmarks and plans of action to achieve specifi ed human rights targets, 
closely monitoring progress and setbacks, constantly mea sur ing and evalu-
ating per for mance, and correspondingly changing policy and practice as 
necessary. In this respect, the distinction between “legal rights” and “pro-
grammatic goals” is a false one, long used as a smokescreen for avoiding 
positive obligations for rights in the social fi eld that are fully and unques-
tioningly undertaken with respect to rights in other fi elds.
Inclusive Education and Work Environments
As a human rights NGO committed to ending the segregation of persons 
with disabilities in all institutional settings and environments, DRI was 
likewise highly motivated with respect to ensuring the treaty’s guarantees 
on inclusive education and inclusive work environments, enshrined in Ar-
ticles 24 and 27, respectively. With respect to the former, DRI played an ac-
tive advocacy role in a number of the very technical aspects of Article 24. Its 
most important contribution, however, lay in helping to ensure the deletion 
of a very strongly supported textual exception to the principle that educa-
tion should always be inclusive. Th at exception would have expressly pro-
vided that “separate education shall be provided” in those circumstances 
where the general education system cannot adequately meet the educational 
needs of persons with disabilities. Together with other NGOs and DPOs, 
DRI argued that this exception would eff ectively swallow the rule, provid-
ing an explicit “let- out” for states to justify maintaining separate educational 
systems for persons with a wide range of intellectual, physical, and sensory 
impairments. Th e Convention, DRI insisted, should not be one of exceptions—
no international human rights treaty is— but rather one of strong principles 
and commitments to work toward systematically on a targeted and tireless 
basis.
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Revealingly, the states supporting this provision argued explicitly that the 
individualized needs of persons with intellectual disabilities cannot be met 
in the general education system, and thus the Convention needed to recog-
nize the appropriateness or acceptability of separate education for persons 
with mental disabilities. In the end, the provision was bitterly fought over, with 
China serving as the holdout until the very last, eighth session. With con-
sensus unable to be reached in fl oor debate, the fi nal text had to be negotiated 
privately in state- to- state consultations and informal small group settings. 
Within this struggle, Australia, the principle state supporter of deleting the 
off ending phrase on separate education, expressly requested assistance from 
DRI on how most eff ectively to frame the legal issues for China’s delegation.
DRI likewise attempted to off er a technical perspective drawn from com-
parative human rights law to help mediate a signifi cant confl ict on the point 
of separate education within the disability community itself. Th at is, groups 
supporting the rights of persons with intellectual disabilities tended to sup-
port vigorously the inclusion of an unqualifi ed “right to inclusive education” 
in the treaty, accompanied by a correlate “prohibition” on separate education 
systems. By contrast, the deafb lind community preferred a “twin- track” ap-
proach that would expressly recognize the right to separate education sys-
tems or state- fi nanced “special” schools for the deaf and blind. In deference 
to the deafb lind community, the IDC had adopted the latter view as one of its 
principle platforms, emphasizing the right to “choice” between separate or 
inclusive education by persons with disabilities themselves.
DRI sought to mediate this confl ict by recognizing two distinct but 
complementary points from international human rights doctrine. First, in 
insisting on the removal of the general reference to “choice of inclusive edu-
cation” for persons with disabilities in favor of a textually unqualifi ed right 
to inclusive education for all, DRI underscored that the “right to educa-
tional choice” in current international law is in fact highly limited. Parents 
and guardians do not enjoy a general right to choose a specifi c type of public 
educational system for their children. Rather, they enjoy only the liberty to 
remove their children from the general public education system, “choosing” 
to place them instead in a private system or home- schooling environment 
that nonetheless conforms to minimum educational standards laid down by 
the state. A broad reference to “choice” within the general education system 
therefore lacks support in international human rights law at present and 
should be replaced, DRI concluded, by a focus on ensuring the right to an 
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inclusive education system at all levels and access to such education in the 
communities in which persons with disabilities live.
At the same time, however, DRI underscored that international law does 
recognize that certain defi ned subgroups with their own cultural identity 
and specifi c needs may be entitled to state funding to establish their own 
educational institutions. Grounded in the internationally recognized right 
to culture, major international instruments enshrining the rights of indig-
enous persons, for example, recognize their right to establish and adminis-
ter their own educational institutions and facilities, accompanied by a 
correlate state duty to provide appropriate fi nancial resources, assistance, 
and training in administering them. Accordingly, just as textual recogni-
tion of a broad “right to educational choice” would lack an established in-
ternational law basis, so too would a “prohibition” on separate education 
systems.
DRI made these technical points in the sixth session, recalling them in 
the seventh and eighth, to underscore the international law basis for support-
ing both positions within the disability community: the imperative of recog-
nizing a broad and unqualifi ed “right to inclusive education” for all, while 
not in the pro cess undermining the right of certain culturally self- identifying 
groups, such as members of the deaf, blind, and deafb lind community, to 
establish their own educational institutions if it is their choice. Th e fi nal text 
of Article 24 refl ects this doctrinally grounded “compromise” position. It also 
refl ects the caution that should, in DRI’s view, generally be exercised in any 
human rights treaty draft ing pro cess with respect to the codifi cation of ab-
solute prohibitory language. In most cases, positively worded guarantees to 
affi  rmative conduct or outcome- based results not only will open a greater di-
versity of creative and multileveled enforcement options, but may also avoid 
signifi cant unintended consequences for diff erently situated social groups 
that are negatively aff ected, including those not well represented in the 
negotiation pro cess.
Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanisms
Finally, with its focus on post- adoption implementation pro cesses and based 
on its on- the- ground experience working with states to ensure deinstitu-
tionalization and community integration, DRI actively intervened on ques-
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tions of monitoring and enforcement at both the national and international 
levels throughout the negotiation pro cess. In this respect, it strongly agreed 
with Senegal’s observation that the CRPD provisions on monitoring and 
enforcement would serve as the “soul” of the Convention, determining how 
it would be implemented on the ground.
With respect to national- level mechanisms, DRI was particularly insis-
tent on ensuring that the Convention include strong in de pen dent monitor-
ing provisions, especially for ser vice provision in both closed institutions 
and community settings. Th us, in addition to systems for general monitoring, 
it emphasized that the Convention should provide for specialized, in de pen dent 
monitoring to protect the rights of people who are especially vulnerable, 
including but not limited to those receiving ser vices in institutions or other 
closed environments. DRI could not close its eyes in this regard to the fact 
that millions of children and adults around the world remain segregated 
from society in closed institutions, within which they oft en lack the means 
to publicize abuses or claim their own rights. At the same time, as countries 
move away from institutions toward community- based ser vices and sup-
ports for persons with disabilities, more and more abuses are found in the 
community. Oft en, what are called “community ser vices” are actually small, 
isolated institutions located in physical proximity to what could be called 
the community. Th us, any oversight and monitoring system must also mon-
itor rights protection in community- based ser vices.
While highlighting numerous comparative models of eff ective rights 
oversight and monitoring bodies from around the world, DRI focused in 
par tic u lar on the standards adopted by the Council of Eu rope in 2004 with 
respect to mental health institutions. Th ese standards specify that, to avoid 
a confl ict of interest and to ensure that abuses by an institution can be chal-
lenged, oversight and monitoring must be conducted by a body that is “or-
gan i za tion ally in de pen dent from the authorities or bodies monitored” and 
should include not only mental health professionals and laypersons, but also 
persons with disabilities and those close to them. Importantly, they likewise 
provide that regular visits and inspections should be able to be undertaken 
without prior notice and that systematic and reliable statistical information 
and information on implementation should be made available to the pub-
lic. At the same time, following the UN Standard Rules on the Equaliza-
tion of Opportunities of Persons with Disabilities, which explicitly recognize 
the rights of persons with disabilities to be involved in monitoring and 
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implementation of human rights that aff ect them, DRI strongly supported 
the early proposals of Sierra Leone and Yemen to expressly incorporate the 
guarantee of direct participation by persons with disabilities and civil soci-
ety organizations in the treaty monitoring pro cess. Th is proposal was explic-
itly incorporated into Article 33(3), decidedly one of the most important 
provisions in the treaty.
DRI was also successful in ensuring that a provision on eff ective mon-
itoring by in de pen dent authorities of all facilities and programs designed 
to serve persons with disabilities was directly included in Article 16 of 
the Convention, which guarantees “freedom from exploitation, violence and 
abuse.”
With regard to an international monitoring and enforcement mecha-
nism, DRI strongly supported the emphasis of Costa Rica and Liechtenstein 
on the importance of a proactive treaty body, one that does not only respond 
to state reports but also— and perhaps principally— is able to react eff ectively 
and promptly to information and complaints of violations presented by per-
sons with disabilities themselves and those who work with them. Indeed, 
DRI’s experience has shown that situations on the ground rarely change until 
persons directly aff ected force that change. Such action nevertheless inevi-
tably requires the support of international oversight bodies empowered to 
accompany the pro cess of contestation, settlement, reform, follow- up, and 
supervision. In this regard, DRI underscored three essential elements it 
believed critical to any international enforcement mechanism: (1) an individ-
ual complaints mechanism; (2) precautionary or urgent interim mea sures; 
and (3) on- site visits.
With respect to the former, DRI questioned the view of others in the 
pro cess that collective complaints procedures are preferable to individual 
communications because they allow structural inequities to be addressed. 
Indeed, DRI has been highly successful in promoting structural reform in 
national mental health systems through the use of individual case- based 
procedures. Such procedures have the decisive advantage of allowing the 
concrete specifi cities and contours of abusive situations to be detailed, allow-
ing for the craft ing of more targeted and responsive remedial mea sures than 
are generally available through collective complaints pro cesses. Off ered 
within the framework of an “eff ective remedy,” such measures— which include 
structural guarantees against nonrepetition— can then be the focus of longer- 
term implementation pro cesses, promoted jointly by international monitor-
ing and on- the- ground civil society mobilization campaigns.
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At the same time, DRI sought to respond to concerns about institu-
tional duplication at the international level by proposing that the Committee 
might consider endowing the CRPD treaty body with the capacity to refer 
individual complaints to the corresponding regional human rights system 
where jurisdictional overlap existed (that is, the Inter- American, Eu ro pe an, 
and African systems)— preferably with its continued participation in an ex-
pert advisory capacity. Th is would simultaneously serve to lessen the work-
load of the Committee— allowing it to focus on individual complaints in 
those regions that lack judicial and quasi- judicial human rights bodies— 
while also helping to mainstream disability rights protections into human 
rights treaties that are not disability specifi c. Because the regional systems 
are well developed and have generally strong dispute settlement, follow- up, 
and supervisory procedures, this might have been one innovative step for-
ward for international enforcement.
In emphasizing the need for the new treaty to innovate with respect to 
international enforcement mechanisms and to avoid the weaknesses of 
the current treaty- body system, DRI likewise underscored the need for the 
treaty- body complaints pro cess to be closely linked with pro cesses for inte-
grated follow- up and continual supervision by monitoring bodies, especially 
given the fact that certain structural reform pro cesses take signifi cant time. 
Simple recommendations, without a follow- up procedure, would be insuffi  -
cient and a tremendous lost opportunity for persons with disabilities. At the 
same time, because international complaints procedures inevitably involve 
signifi cant delay, DRI believed it essential for the treaty to provide for urgent 
interim mea sures to protect persons with disabilities from grave and irrepa-
rable harm that can occur while a complaint is being pro cessed. On- site visits, 
DRI believed, also serve as a critical implementation tool to allow members 
of the monitoring body to see abuses fi rsthand, to consult and negotiate 
directly with decision makers, to hear directly from persons aff ected, and to 
put remedial action plans in place in cooperation with responsible govern-
ments and in consultation with civil society.
In supporting these positions and others, DRI put forward detailed 
amendments to the draft ing proposals in circulation, seeking to ensure that 
the treaty body created under the new Convention would indeed innovate 
beyond the current treaty body structure. Unfortunately, in the end, this did 
not come to pass. Th e CRPD treaty body, in its composition and functions, 
looks almost identical to those of the other major UN human rights treaty 
bodies. Th e one innovation in the human rights fi eld was a Conference of 
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States Parties, borrowed from the Land Mines Treaty, the eff ectiveness of 
which is still to be seen.
Final Refl ections
As pointed out by others in this volume, the fi nal CRPD is not perfect. It 
contains provisions that could have been better draft ed and it omits protec-
tions or concepts that some stakeholders would have liked to have seen in-
cluded. At the same time, signifi cant opportunities for creating new and 
creative mechanisms at the international level to promote national- level 
compliance with the CRPD  were unfortunately not taken up. Overall, how-
ever, the CRPD is a comprehensive and highly useful tool for promoting the 
rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, and it will have an important 
impact on the way the rights of persons with disabilities are fought for both 
domestically and internationally for generations to come.
In contributing to the fi nal treaty outcome, DRI won many of its battles 
and lost many others. It nonetheless believes that it played an important role 
in the pro cess, especially in providing a consistent technical perspective on 
the draft ing proposals as they evolved and in maintaining a principled focus 
on the long- term operability of the treaty text in post- adoption implementa-
tion pro cesses. As highlighted earlier, this role served to complement the ad-
vocacy role taken by many other DPOs and NGOs in the negotiations and, 
in the end, strengthened, we believe, the overall civil society presence in the 
draft ing pro cess. At the same time, it is important to recognize that the ar-
guments DRI advanced and the principles it fought for will continue to play 
a vital and central po liti cal role in the much harder implementation work 
ahead of transforming the substantive norms and pro cess commitments 
of the CRPD into concrete, meaningful change for aff ected communities 
worldwide.
